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Note
Statutory Limitations on Corporate Spending in Ballot
Measure Campaigns: The Case for
Constitutionality
Twenty-three states and the District of Columbia currently provide
for the enactment of legislation by ballot measure.1 These provisions
were enacted to shift power and political influence away from well-fi-
nanced or well-connected interest groups toward the general public and
groups lacking extensive connections or finances. 2 In the past decade,
use of the ballot measure3 process has steadily increased.4 One contro-
versial question attending the use of this process is whether a great dis-
parity in spending between the sides in ballot measure campaigns affects
the results of such campaigns.
Many commentators have concluded that disproportionate spending
does exert a dominating influence in these campaigns. 5 In several states,
proposals highly favored in early polls have been defeated after massive
media spending by the opposition late in the campaign. 6 The degree of
1. 125 CONG. REC. 1806, 1806-07 (1979) (remarks of Sen. Hatfield). Actually, all states
except Delaware provide for amending the state constitution by ballot measure. Ranney, The
United States ofAmerica, in REFERENDUMS 67 (D. Butler & A. Ranney eds. 1978). California
provides for enacting statutes or amending the state constitution by either initiative or referen-
dum. CAL. ELEC. CODE § 3524 (West Supp. 1984).
2. R. HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF REFORM 254-62 (1955); G. MOWRY, THE CALIFOR-
NIA PROGRESSIVES 139 (1951); see also Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 299 (1962) (Frankfurter,
J., dissenting).
3. In this Note, "ballot measure" is used generically to denote all forms of direct democ-
racy-including the initiative and the referendum. While usage is somewhat imprecise in the
United States, the term "initiative" is generally used to denote a proposed law or constitutional
amendment placed on the ballot because a specified number or percentage of registered voters
have signed petitions to that effect. "Referendum" refers to a law passed by the legislature but
nevertheless placed on the ballot because of such a voter petition. In either case, the provision
goes into effect only after approval by a majority, or sometimes a supermajority, vote. Lowen-
stein, Campaign Spending and Ballot Propositions: Recent Experience, Public Choice Theory
and the First Amendment, 29 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 505, 508 n.4 (1982).
4. Initiative News Report of Washington, D.C., Nov. 30, 1984, at 11.
5. See Lowenstein, supra note 3, at 510 n.16 (contains a survey of those who have ex-
pressed this view, many without citing empirical evidence).
6. Easley, Buying Back the First Amendment: Regulation of Disproportionate Corporate
Spending in Ballot Issue Campaigns, 17 GA. L. REv. 675, 686-95 (1983); Mastro, Costlow &
Sanchez, Taking the Initiative: Corporate Control of the Referendum Process Through Media
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disproportionate spending on these proposals, which concerned nuclear
energy issues, mandatory deposits for beverage containers, and other
measures opposed by large corporate interests, 7 ranged from three-to-one
to two hundred-to-one.
8
Other commentators contend that even greatly disproportionate
spending is not an important factor in determining the outcome of ballot
measure elections. 9 Professor Ronald J. Allen, for instance, asserts that
monied interests do not threaten to dominate a proposed national initia-
tive process. 10 Although he acknowledges that "[o]rganized, monied in-
terests clearly have an advantage in qualifying measures for the ballot,"
he concludes that they cannot buy the election."
A recent study by Professor Daniel Lowenstein, however, has docu-
mented the dominating influence of disproportionate spending in ballot
measure campaigns in California.' 2 Perhaps more important, Professor
Lowenstein has explained the apparently inconsistent results of previous
empirical studies by distinguishing spending in support of ballot measures
from spending in opposition to ballot measures. 13 The Lowenstein study
demonstrates that although "one-sided spending has been ineffective
when it is in support of a proposition, it has been almost invariably suc-
cessful when it is in opposition." '
14
The studies in this area reveal that the priniary sources of funds for
one-sided spending in opposition to ballot measures are business corpora-
tions. 15 The ability of business corporations' 6 to defeat ballot measures
Spending and What To Do About It, 32 FED. COM. L.J. 315, 319-27 (1980) [hereinafter cited as
Mastro].
7. See infra note 15 & accompanying text.
8. Easley, supra note 6, at 687-91. Opponents of a 1976 Massachusetts bottle bill out-
spent the bill's supporters 35 to 1. Id. at 687. Opponents of a similar measure in Colorado that
same year outspent the bill's supporters 50 to 1. Mastro, supra note 6, at 321.
9. These commentators have supported their positions with empirical data. See, e.g.,
Allen, The National Initiative Proposal: A Preliminary Analysis, 58 NEB. L. REV. 965, 1028-38
(1979); see also Lee, California, in REFERENDUMS, supra note 1, at 104-06.
10. Allen, supra note 9. Citing data primarily from candidate campaigns, id. at 1029,
Professor Allen concludes that "It]he limited data we have, then, tends to confirm the suspi-
cion that money. . . is not a dominant factor in determining the outcomes of initiated meas-
ures." Id. at 1035.
11. Id. at 1036.
12. Lowenstein, supra note 3, at 517-47. The study covered 25 California ballot measures
between 1968 and 1980 that involved significantly disparate spending.
13. Professor Lowenstein credits others with having recognized the significance of such a
distinction. Id. at 511 n.21. Professor Lowenstein is apparently the first to document the view.
14. Id. at 511.
15. Easley, supra note 6, at 687, 691 (opposition to bottle bill and nuclear energy meas-
ures was almost entirely corporate generated); Lowenstein, supra note 3, at 533-34 & n. 112,
537 & n. 128, 540 & n. 148 (detailing the major sources of funds for campaigns in opposition to
the California ballot measures studied); Mastro, supra note 6, at 320 (all three Colorado initia-
tive campaigns studied were "staunchly opposed" by corporate interests and corporate
money).
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through massive, one-sided spending may frustrate the purpose of these
direct democratic processes because, despite the existence of ballot meas-
ures, power remains in the hands of well-financed interest groups.
Several schemes have been proposed to eliminate the influence of
massive spending on the election process. Some states have enacted laws
that require the filing of campaign statements disclosing the amount of
contributions and expenditures, and the identities of those who contrib-
ute more than a certain amount. 17 Federal regulations also require spon-
sorship identification for broadcasts of political or social messages.18
These rules nonetheless may be ineffective for curbing corporate influ-
ence in campaigns. For example, if they provide only for the identifica-
tion of central groups that may receive funds from various sources, then
the true identity of the corporate contributor can remain hidden from the
general public. 19 Thus, the primary value of disclosure laws lies in docu-
menting the corporate influence on ballot measure campaigns, not in
curbing that influence.
20
Public financing of ballot measure campaigns has also been pro-
posed as a means of curbing corporate influence. 21 This method of re-
form has received little consideration, however, presumably because it
entails technical and administrative problems and significant cost.
22
Limitation on private spending is the most plausible means of curb-
ing corporate influence on the election process. Private spending can be
limited in two ways: contribution limits and expenditure limits. 23 As of
1977, eighteen states limited or prohibited corporate contributions to bal-
16. As used in this Note, the term "business corporation" is meant to exclude member-
ship organizations, cooperatives, or coporations without capital stock. This is consistent with
the usage of the terms in 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(4)(c) (1982). Unless otherwise indicated, "corpo-
ration," or any derivative thereof, is used interchangeably with "business corporation."
17. See, ag., CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 84200, 84210 (West 1976) (contributions over $50);
MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 13-37-225, -229, -230 (1983) (contributions of $25 or more). At least
21 states have enacted some form of disclosure law regarding ballot measure campaign contri-
butions. See Mastro, supra note 6, at 353-54.
18. 47 C.F.R. § 73.1212 (1983).
19. Mastro, supra note 6, at 353-54 & n.127; see also D. ADAMANY & G. AGREE, POLIT-
ICAL MONEY 103-15 (1975).
20. Mastro, supra note 6, at 354.
21. See Lowenstein, supra note 3, at 578.
22. Professor Lowenstein has proposed a plan for public financing of ballot measure cam-
paigns that he thinks is workable. See id. at 578-83. One can expect, however, that legislators
will be reluctant to adopt large-scale public financing provisions, particularly in light of cur-
rent budget deficits and the recent disdain for "big" government.
23. Contribution limits restrict the amounts individuals or entities can contribute to a
central committee organized to support or oppose a ballot measure or candidate. Expenditure
limits restrict the amounts that can be spent, either by individual candidates directly or by
central committees, in the campaign. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14-23, 58 (1976); see infra
notes 33-42 & accompanying text.
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lot measure campaigns.24 In the 1974 primary election, California voters
adopted expenditure limits on ballot measure campaigns. 25 Such provi-
sions could go far toward curbing the dominating corporate influence in
ballot measure campaigns.
The constitutionality of these and other statutory limits on corpo-
rate spending in ballot measure campaigns, however, has been seriously
questioned. The Supreme Court has invalidated contribution and expen-
diture limits in various contexts, and state courts have followed suit.26 In
contrast, the Court has affirmed the constitutionality of disclosure laws,
2 7
and the use of public financing in ballot measure campaigns would seem
to present no constitutional problem, 28 under the same reasoning the
Court has used to uphold public financing of presidential campaigns.
29
The constitutionality of these reforms is small consolation, however, due
to the ineffectiveness of disclosure laws and the cost and other problems
associated with public financing.
30
This Note presents several theoretical bases for upholding statutory
restrictions on corporate spending in ballot measure campaigns. The
Note first reviews the line of decisions that implies a constitutional bar-
rier to the implementation of such regulations. It then analyzes two
methods by which this barrier can be removed and compares the poten-
tial advantages and disadvantages of each. The Note advances a theoret-
ical justification for one of these methods which may be more satisfactory
than justifications previously advanced. According to the argument ad-
vanced here, the rights of the corporate speaker do not justify constitu-
tional protection for the political speech of business corporations. Such
protection serves neither of the primary values underlying first amend-
ment protection of political speech. Because corporate political speech is
not a product of free choice, its protection does not serve the self-fulfill-
ment value. 3 1 Nor does it serve the interest in promoting successful self-
government, because, as will be shown, the corporate speaker is unable to
advocate positions on public policy issues based on considerations of
justice.
32
24. First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 803 n.1 (1978) (White, J., dissenting); see
also S. LYDENBERG, BANKROLLING BALLOTS: UPDATE 2 (1980).
25. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 85300-85305 (West 1976) (repealed 1977) (one side prohibited
from spending in excess of $500,000 more than the other side in a ballot measure campaign).
These provisions were invalidated by the California Supreme Court in Citizens for Jobs &
Energy v. Fair Political Practices Comm'n, 16 Cal. 3d 671, 547 P.2d 1386, 129 Cal. Rptr. 106
(1976), and subsequently repealed. See infra note 43 & accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 33-54 & accompanying text.
27. See Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 792 n.32; Buckley, 424 U.S. at 84 & n.113.
28. Lowenstein, supra note 3, at 581-82.
29. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 85-108.
30. See supra notes 17-22 & accompanying text.
31. See infra notes 108-16, 127 & accompanying text.
32. See infra notes 128-75 & accompanying text.
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The Constitutional Barriers
The constitutionality of statutory restrictions on corporate spending
in ballot measure campaigns has been drawn into question by several
Supreme Court decisions. In Buckley v. Valeo,33 the Court heard consti-
tutional challenges to key provisions of the Federal Election Campaign
Act of 1971. 34 The Act imposed limits on campaign contributions and
overall expenditures, and established disclosure and recordkeeping re-
quirements in elections for President, Vice-President, and members of
Congress. 35 The Act also provided for some public financing of such
elections.3 6 Challenged by various candidates, contributors, political
parties, and public interest groups, 37 the Act had been upheld by the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.
38
The Supreme Court upheld the public financing, disclosure, and re-
cordkeeping provisions against several constitutional challenges.
39 It
also upheld two types of contribution limits: limits on the amount that
an individual or a political action committee could contribute to a partic-
ular candidate's campaign and limits on the overall amount an individual
could contribute in any year.40 But the Court invalidated the Act's ex-
penditure limits, which would have imposed ceilings on the amount that
any candidate could expend on his own behalf and on the level of overall
spending by any candidate's campaign.41 The Court viewed these provi-
sions as unjustified infringements upon the first amendment rights of can-
33. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
34. 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-456 (1976) (enacted 1971, amended 1974).
35. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 7.
36. See id. at 85-90. The Federal Election Campaign Act established the Presidential
Election Campaign Fund, which is financed from revenues collected through the taxpayers'
designation that one dollar of federal income tax liability be paid to the Fund. See 26 U.S.C.
§§ 9006-9013 (1982).
37. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 7-8.
38. Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821 (D.C. Cir. 1975). The court of appeals' per curiam
opinion noted that
[t]he corrosive influence of money blights our democratic processes. . . . The ex-
cesses revealed by this record-the campaign spending [and] funding. . .- support
the legislative judgment that the situation . . . must not be allowed to deteriorate
further. . . . [Trhese latest efforts on the part of our government to cleanse its
democratic processes. . . should not be rejected because they might have some inci-
dental, not clearly defined, effect on First Amendment freedoms.
Id. at 897-98. Judge Skelly Wright, who was instrumental in forging the District of Columbia
Circuit's opinion, has criticized the Supreme Court's reversal of part of this decision. See
Wright, Politics and the Constitution: Is Money Speech?, 85 YALE L.J. 1001 (1976).
39. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 84 & n.113, 108 & n.147.
40. Id. at 58-59 & n.67. The Court viewed these contribution limits as necessary to fur-
ther the compelling state interest in preventing the reality or appearance of corruption of
elected officials. See infra note 65 & accompanying text.
41. Id. at 58-59 & n.67.
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didates and potential contributors.4 2
The destructive impact of the Court's decisions upon the states' abil-
ity to curb the influence of corporate spending on the ballot measure
process was soon apparent. Shortly after Buckley, the California
Supreme Court invalidated, "under the rule of Buckley v. Valeo," the
expenditure limits on ballot measure campaigns passed by California vot-
ers in 1974.
43
Two years after Buckley, in First National Bank v. Bellotti,44 the
Court addressed the question of restrictions on corporate spending in
ballot measure campaigns. At issue was a Massachusetts statute prohib-
iting business corporations from making contributions or expenditures to
influence the outcome of any ballot measure that did not materially affect
the property, assets, or business of the corporation. 45 The corporations
challenging the statute had sought to contribute to a campaign opposing
a state constitutional amendment that allowed for a graduated tax on the
income of individuals.
46
In a close decision, the Court, per Justice Powell, invalidated the
Massachusetts statute as an unconstitutional infringement on the first
amendment rights of business corporations. Justice White, joined by Jus-
tices Brennan and Marshall, contended in dissent that the statute did not
infringe first amendment freedoms 47 and that even if it did, such an in-
fringement was justified by a compelling state interest.4 8 Justice Rehn-
quist, in a separate dissent, agreed that business corporations should not
have first amendment rights in this context. 49 Three years later, in Citi-
zens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley,50 the Court considered the
constitutionality of a municipal ordinance limiting contributions to com-
mittees in support of, or in opposition to, ballot measures.5" The ordi-
nance was challenged by a committee formed to oppose a ballot measure
that would have imposed rent control. 52 Possibly because the ordinance
affected individuals as well as corporate contributors, its impact on first
amendment rights was conceded.5 3 The Court found no adequate justifi-
cation for the infringement on first amendment freedoms and invalidated
42. Id. at 39-59.
43. Citizens for Jobs & Energy v. Fair Political Practices Comm'n, 16 Cal. 3d 671, 675,
547 P.2d 1386, 1388, 129 Cal. Rptr. 106, 108 (1976); see supra note 25 & accompanying text.
44. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
45. Id. at 767-68.
46. Id. at 769.
47. Id. at 804-09; see also infra notes 107-09 & accompanying text.
48. Id. at 809-12; see also infra notes 71-72 & accompanying text.
49. Id. at 822-28; see also infra note 106 & accompanying text.
50. 454 U.S. 290 (1981).
51. Id. at 292. The contributions were limited to $250. BERKELEY, CAL., ELECTION
REFORM AT § 602 (1974).
52. Citizens Against Rent Control, 454 U.S. at 292.





Through these decisions the Court has tacitly "assumed the power
to regulate federal and state elections. ' 55 The Court has deprived both
the voters and their elected representatives of the only effective means of
curbing corporate domination of ballot measure campaigns-statutory
restrictions on corporate campaign spending.
5 6
Although currently the issue lies dormant in the courts, the problem
of undue corporate influence on the ballot measure process persists.
5 7
States continue to consider enacting legislation that is likely to be tested
for constitutionality. Because the composition of the Court has
changed58 since Bellotti, the last case in which it squarely addressed the
issue of limitations on corporate spending in ballot measure campaigns,
the Court could reach a different result if it reconsiders the question.
Thus, a reassessment of the constitutional considerations in this area is in
order.
Theoretical Bases for Upholding Corporate Campaign Spending
Limits in the Face of First Amendment Challenge
Two Approaches
Corporate campaign spending limits can be upheld against first
amendment challenges in two ways. First, the Court could conclude that
such restrictions are justified infringements on the first amendment rights
of corporations and other speakers. Second, the Court could hold that
the first amendment does not provide the same protection for the polit-
ical speech of business corporations that it provides for natural persons
and nonbusiness organizations.
This part of the Note first evaluates the justified infringement ap-
proach and indicates that reliance on this approach may be misplaced. It
then explores the theoretical justifications that have been advanced for
the second approach-the "no constitutional protection" approach.
Those justifications, however, may be inadequate according to many first
amendment theories. Accordingly, the next part proposes a theoretical
justification for the "no constitutional protection" approach that is con-
sistent with generally accepted first amendment theories.
54. Id. at 295-300.
55. Forrester, The New Constitutional Right to Buy Elections, 69 A.B.A. J. 1078, 1079
(1983).
56. See supra notes 17-25 & accompanying text.
57. See supra notes 5-16 & accompanying text.
58. Justice Stewart, who voted with the Bellotti majority, has been replaced by Justice
O'Connor.
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The Justified Infringement Approach
Regulations that adversely affect an activity protected by the first
amendment 59 are closely scrutinized by the Court, but can be upheld if
the infringement on first amendment rights is justified.60 The Court has
consistently subjected campaign spending limits to strict scrutiny.
6'
Under this analysis such regulations, if they infringe upon protected ac-
tivity,62 will be upheld only if the government can show that: first, the
regulation is necessary to further a compelling governmental interest,
and second, the regulation is a closely tailored means to this end.
63
In Buckley, the Court upheld some of the challenged regulations
64
as necessary to further the government's interest in preventing corrup-
tion of officials elected with the help of massive campaign contribu-
tions. 65 As the Bellotti Court correctly noted, the danger of corruption
of public officials is not present in the area of ballot measure cam-
paigns. 66 The compelling state interest that motivates-and should jus-
tify-statutory limits on spending in ballot measure campaigns is
preventing corruption of the election process. This interest has been ar-
ticulated as preserving the integrity or fairness of the election process and
as sustaining the confidence of the citizens in the integrity of the election
process and the democratic form of their government. 67 These alterna-
tives suggest slightly different subinterests.
If sufficient evidence of undue corporate influence on the ballot mea-
sure election process was not available to the Bellotti Court, 68 it is readily
59. Some forms of speech are not within the scope of the first amendment. See, e.g., Paris
Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 54 (1974) (obscene material); Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942) (fighting words). The view that corporate political
speech is not protected by the first amendment is explored infra notes 98-183 & accompanying
text.
60. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 792-95 (1978) (right of free
speech); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25 (1976) (right of political association); Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214 (1972) (right of religious freedom).
61. See, e.g., Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 786, 792-95; Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25.
62. For arguments that corporate political speech is not activity that should be protected
by the first amendment, see infra text accompanying notes 98-175.
63. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 786; Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25.
64. See supra notes 33-42 & accompanying text.
65. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25-29.
66. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 787 n.26, 788.
67. In Bellotti, the state argued both these points. 435 U.S. at 789; see also Easley, supra
note 6, at 723-26 (the interest is the need to save the ballot issue campaign process from "de-
struction through corporate domination and control"); Lowenstein, supra note 3, at 587 (the
interest is in making "ballot measure elections fairer").
68. The Bellotti Court recognized that preserving the fairness of the electoral process and
the confidence of the public is "of the highest importance" and could "merit our considera-
tion" in an appropriate case. 435 U.S. at 789. But the Court found no showing in the record
that such interests were, in fact, implicated in the Massachusetts case. "[Tihere has been no
showing that the relative voice of corporations has been overwhelming or even significant in
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available now.69 For this reason, some commentators have advocated
the justified infringement approach as a rationale for upholding cam-
paign spending limits of various types on ballot measure campaigns.70
Justice White endorsed this approach in his dissent in Bellotti.71 He
noted the evidence of corporate domination of the electoral process in
Massachusetts and other states, and contended that the danger of such
influence justifies state and federal measures aimed at eliminating this
threat.
72
There are several reasons to favor the justified infringement ap-
proach to upholding spending restrictions on ballot measure campaigns.
First, although the Bellotti Court refused to uphold the Massachusetts
statute, the opinion of the Court implied that the justified infringement
approach might succeed in an appropriate case.73 Moreover, in several
places the opinion calls into question the validity of the "no constitu-
tional protection" approach by categorically rejecting the view that cor-
porate political speech is not constitutionally protected.74 The slim
Bellotti majority and the subsequent change in the composition of the
Court,75 however, may indicate potential for a new ruling on this latter
point.
influencing referenda in Massachusetts, or that there has been any threat to the confidence of
the citizenry in government." Id. at 789-90 (footnote omitted). The majority opinion accused
Justice White of relying on "incomplete facts" in finding a "domination of the electoral process
by corporate wealth" in his dissenting opinion. Id. at 789 n.28.
Professor Easley contends that "a stronger case for the danger of corporate dominance
could have been made than was presented in the case before the [Bellotti ] Court." See Easley,
supra note 6, at 686. The Court may simply have refused to balance the state interest against
the first amendment rights of corporations in spite of sufficient evidence. See infra notes 92-94
& accompanying text.
69. See supra notes 6-16 & accompanying text.
70. See, eg., Easley, supra note 6, at 723-26; Lowenstein, supra note 3, at 587.
71. 435 U.S. at 809-12 (White, J., dissenting).
72. Id. at 810-12 & n.11.
73. See supra note 68.
74. "The First Amendment. . .serves significant societal interests," the Bellotti Court
said. "The proper question. . . is not whether corporations 'have' First Amendment rights,"
but whether the Massachusetts statute "abridges expression that the First Amendment was
meant to protect." 435 U.S. at 776. Corporate political speech, because it is about matters of
public concern, "is the type of speech indispensable to decisionmaking in a democracy, and
this is no less true because the speech comes from a corporation, rather than an individual.
The inherent worth of the speech. . . does not depend upon the identity of its source, whether
corporation, association, union, or individual." Id. at 777. This view, that the source of com-
munication is irrelevant to first amendment analysis, is based on the theory that "the people in
our democracy are entrusted with the responsibility for judging and evaluating the relative
merits of conflicting arguments." Id. at 791 (footnote omitted). Accordingly, this view seems
based on the rights of hearers. Elsewhere in the Bellotti opinion, the Court seems to base its
holding on the rights of the corporate speaker: "the concept that government may restrict the
speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly
foreign to the First Amendment." Id. at 790-91.
75. See supra note 58.
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The justified infringement approach also might be used to uphold
broader restrictions. Both corporate and noncorporate contribution lim-
its, as well as limits on overall expenditures by one side in a campaign,
could be justified.76 In addition, the approach could provide an alterna-
tive method of justifying spending limits in candidate campaigns if the
danger of corruption of elected officials is difficult to show or if the chal-
lenger contends that a less drastic means serves that end.
77
Finally, the justified infringement approach encompasses situations
that the "no constitutional protection" approach does not. The first
amendment protects the rights of hearers as well as those of speakers.
78
When it is appropriate to focus on the rights of hearers, the source of the
information is irrelevant to deciding whether the communication is pro-
tected. Thus, the "no constitutional protection" approach, which fo-
cuses on the source of corporate political speech, is an inappropriate
rationale for upholding infringements on those rights.
7 9
The justified infringement approach, however, would provide a ra-
tionale for restrictions on the rights of hearers. Assuming that corporate
campaign spending limits do diminish the flow of communications to the
public and thus constitute infringements upon the rights of hearers, they
are imposed in order to enhance the value of those very same rights. If
the state can show that such regulations give the hearing public better
access to a wider range of ideas, then these restrictions should be upheld
as justified "infringements" upon the rights of hearers. Arguably, restric-
tions on corporate political contributions do not infringe upon the rights
of hearers at all. Directors, officers, and shareholders remain free to fund
political campaigns and publish messages at their own expense and in
their own right. Justice Rehnquist saw no infringement upon the rights
of hearers in the Bellotti case because "[t]he free flow of information is in
no way diminished."18 0 Three other Justices agreed.8 '
To the extent that the Court chooses to scrutinize such legislation
76. Protecting the electoral process from the dominating influence of disproportionate
spending would justify restrictions on contributions from whatever source. The "no constitu-
tional protection" approach, on the other hand, is aimed only at upholding restrictions on
corporate spending. See infra notes 98-175 & accompanying text.
77. Because massive disproportionate spending may have a dominating influence on can-
didate campaigns, the interest in preserving the integrity of the election process would justify
spending limits in those campaigns as well. Preventing the corruption of elected officials is the
only governmental interest heretofore recognized by the court as justifying spending limits in
candidate campaigns. See supra notes 64-67 & accompanying text.
78. See infra note 117 & accompanying text.
79. When the rights of hearers are at issue, communications are valuable because of their
content, not their source. See supra note 74. The "no constitutional protection" approach
argues that the source of corporate political speech is not deserving of first amendment protec-
tion in its own right. See infra notes 98-183 & accompanying text.
80. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 828 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
81. Id. at 806-08 (White, J., dissenting).
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on the basis of whether it infringes upon the rights of speakers,82 a more
difficult problem of justification is presented: the infringed fights of
speakers are pitted against the enhanced rights of hearers. Under this
analysis, the relevant preliminary question is, "Which speakers should
receive first amendment protection?" In this context, the "no constitu-
tional protection" approach could be used to uphold restrictions on cor-
porate speakers.
Thus, the justified infringement approach may be both an appropri-
ate method of scrutinizing ballot measure spending restrictions and a po-
tentially successful means to reverse the Court's direction in this area.
Proponents of these restrictions, however, should be wary of relying
solely on this approach, for several reasons.
First, the Court has been known to resort to literal readings of the
first amendment and to eschew interpreting it as protecting the fairness
of political debate at the expense of infringing upon the freedom of pro-
tected sources of information or ideas. For example, in Miami Herald
Publishing Co. v. Tornillo,83 the Court invalidated a state statute giving a
right-of-reply to current candidates for public office who had been at-
tacked in newspaper editorials.84 The Court recognized the very real
threat posed by the concentration "in a few hands [of] the power to in-
form the American people and shape public opinion." 85 The state had
argued that the elimination of this threat was a compelling state interest
that justified the infringement on the first amendment rights of newspa-
pers. In reaching its decision, the Court relied solely on its observation
that the governmental coercion involved amounted to "a confrontation
with the express provisions of the First Amendment."
86
The Tornillo Court's cursory analysis in this context was unusual.
Over a wide range of issues, once it determines that a governmental regu-
lation obstructs the exercise of first amendment rights, the Court nor-
mally considers whether the obstruction is justified by compelling
governmental interests.8 7 Professor Emerson has pointed out that
Tornillo is one of two cases in which the Burger Court departed from this
analysis and applied an "absolute" doctrine, refusing to consider whether
the state interest justifies the infringement.88 As long as corporate polit-
82. The Bellotti Court seemed to base its holding, at least in part, on the rights of the
corporate speaker. See supra note 74.
83. 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
84. Id. at 256-58.
85. Id. at 250.
86. Id. at 254.
87. See, eg., Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 62-63 (1976) (local
ordinance restricting location of theaters exhibiting sexually explicit films); Buckley, 424 U.S.
at 15-23 (various campaign spending regulations); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395
U.S. 367, 386-401 (1969) (access to broadcast media); see also supra note 60 & accompanying
text.
88. Emerson, First Amendment Doctrine and the Burger Court, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 422,
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ical speech is recognized as having first amendment protection, legislative
restrictions on corporate spending to influence the outcome of ballot
measure campaigns may be invalidated by courts utilizing this approach.
A second reason to avoid relying solely on the justified infringement
approach is indicated by the treatment accorded it in Bellotti.8 9 The
plaintiff presented to the Court evidence of substantial disparities in cam-
paign expenditures in previous unsuccessful initiatives in Massachusetts.
The State of Montana filed an amicus curiae brief noting its similar expe-
rience with an initiative. 90 This evidence, along with a report from the
California Fair Political Practices Commission concerning the 1976 Cali-
fornia primary election, was cited by Justice White in his dissent.9 1 De-
spite this evidence, the Bellotti Court's slim majority was unwilling to
find a demonstrable "compelling state interest" justifying the
infringement.
Even more disconcerting is the Bellotti Court's suggestion that, even
if supported in the record, the arguments for restricting a corporation's
right to spend in ballot measure campaigns to protect the election process
from corruption were "[not] inherently persuasive or supported by the
precedents of this Court."'92 The Court, citing language from two first
amendment cases, implied that such restrictions might well be constitu-
tionally infirm no matter how substantial the showing of the counter-
vailing state or governmental interest in preserving the integrity of the
election process. 93 These passages are reminiscent of the absolute doc-
trine employed in the Tornillo case.
94
Finally, the justified infringement approach may not be helpful to
those seeking to uphold regulations of corporate political speech in areas
other than campaign spending. In certain of these contexts, the compel-
ling state interest justifying restrictions on corporate activities designed
to influence the resolution of current issues may be difficult to demon-
strate, even if present. For example, in Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public
449 (1980). The other example of this refusal to balance is Linmark Assocs. v. Willingboro,
431 U.S. 85 (1977), in which a local ordinance prohibiting real estate "For Sale" or "Sold"
signs to stem white-flight was invalidated on first amendment grounds.
89. Emerson, supra note 88, at 449-50.
90. Id. at 433.
91. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 810-11 & n.l1. The 1972 Massachusetts initiative involved a
disparity in spending levels of $120,000 to $7,000. In that same year in Montana, the disparity
was $144,000 to $451. Id.
92. Id. at 790.
93. Justice Powell was unmoved by the argument that corporate advertising could influ-
ence elections: "The Constitution 'protects expression which is eloquent no less than that
which is unconvincing.'" Id. (quoting Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 360 U.S. 684,
689 (1959)). The Justice also noted that "the concept that government may restrict the speech
of some elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly
foreign to the First Amendment." 435 U.S. at 790-91 (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 48-49).
94. See supra notes 83-88 & accompanying text.
[Vol. 36
Service Commission,95 the state was unable to satisfy the Court that any
compelling state interest justified a prohibition against the public utility
companies' practice of distributing inserts discussing controversial issues
of public policy along with the monthly electric bills. The state restric-
tion was aimed at a practice potentially no less influential than massive
corporate campaign contributions. But the influence of such bill inserts
is much more difficult to demonstrate than is that of corporate spending
in ballot measure campaigns, for which election results and data on cam-
paign spending can be correlated. Comparable evidence of the impact of
bill inserts is unavailable if such communication is not directed toward
the outcome of any particular election or legislative action. In attempt-
ing to justify the infringement in Consolidated Edison, the state was
forced, because of a lack of such empirical data, to rely on interests other
than preventing the dominating influence of the bill inserts.96 The Court
was unpersuaded and invalidated the prohibition as an unconstitutional
infringement of the first amendment rights of the corporations affected.
97
Thus, despite the possibilities and advantages of the justified in-
fringement approach, the Court's cursory analysis of the justifications for
the approach in Tornillo and Bellotti suggests that the approach may
prove inadequate as a means of upholding ballot measure campaign
spending limits.
The "No Constitutional Protection" Approach-Prior Theoretical
Justifications
Another approach to upholding statutory limits on corporate spend-
ing in ballot measure campaigns may be more effective. The "no consti-
tutional protection" approach centers on the thesis that the first
amendment provides no protection to the political speech 98 of business
corporations. Such an interpretation of the first amendment renders un-
necessary any showing of a compelling governmental interest to justify
statutory restrictions that would otherwise constitute infringements upon
protected activity.
The Bellotti Court rejected one form of the "no constitutional pro-
tection" approach. The Court reversed the Massachusetts Supreme Judi-
cial Court's holding that "only when a general political issue materially
affects a corporation's business, property or assets may that corporation
95. 447 U.S. 530 (1980).
96. Id. at 540-41.
97. Id. at 533-44.
98. In this Note, "corporate political speech" denotes the spending of corporate funds by
business corporations to influence election results or otherwise to shape political decisions.
The argument that such spending is conduct and not speech was rejected in Buckley, 424 U.S.
at 15-17. It is important to note that the corporate speech considered here is not commercial
speech. See infra notes 182-83 & accompanying text.
January 1985] CORPORATE CAMPAIGN SPENDING
claim First Amendment protection for its speech . . . on that issue."99
At first glance it appears that even if the Court had adopted the Massa-
chusetts court's view,100 the decision would not significantly affect corpo-
rate spending in ballot measure campaigns. The political speech of
business corporations could still receive constitutional protection if re-
lated to issues materially affecting the property interests of the corpora-
tion. The primary threat to the political process posed by corporate
contributions arises in those campaigns in which the outcome will have a
significant effect on the corporation's business or assets. 0 1
Deeper analysis reveals, however, that despite its limitation, the
Massachusetts court's formulation of the "no constitutional protection"
approach might have significant impact. According to the Massachu-
setts court, the constitutional protection afforded this speech was an inci-
dent of fourteenth amendment protection of the corporation's property
and business interest, rather than the first amendment. 102 Legislative re-
strictions on corporate political speech, if regarded as affecting only busi-
ness and property interests, could be upheld under a rational basis
standard of review upon a showing that the regulation was reasonably
related to a legitimate governmental purpose. 103 This lower standard of
scrutiny could result in less frequent invalidation of such regulations
than would occur under the "compelling state interest" standard.' °
4
Both dissenting opinions in Bellotti endorsed versions of the "no
constitutional protection" approach, 10 5 though they did so for different
reasons. Justice Rehnquist noted that a corporation's right of political
expression was not necessary to the fulfillment of the commercial func-
tions or purposes for which it was created under state law. Because the
constitutional protection of such expression was not "incidental to its
very existence," a corporation's right to political speech was not pro-
tected by the first amendment. 106
99. First Nat'l Bank v. Attorney Gen., 371 Mass. 773, 785, 359 N.E.2d 1262, 1270
(1977).
100. All four dissenters in Bellotti agreed with the Massachusetts court's holding. See
supra notes 47-49 & accompanying text; infra notes 105-09 & accompanying text.
101. See supra notes 8-16 & accompanying text.
102. 371 Mass. at 784, 359 N.E.2d at 1270.
103. See Olsen v. Nebraska ex rel. W. Reference & Bond Ass'n, 313 U.S. 236, 244-47
(1941) (renouncing the Court's former due process philosophy, under which the Court would
review the wisdom of economic regulations); Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 525-39
(1934) (New York's milk price fixing statute not violative of due process because not unreason-
able, arbitrary, or capricious).
104. "Since 1941, the Court has consistently maintained that under the due process clause
the making of legislative policy on economic matters is solely for the legislatures and beyond
the scope of the judicial function." W. LOCKHART, Y. KAMISAR & J. CHOPER, CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW 449 (5th ed. 1980) [hereinafter cited as W. LOCKHART].
105. Both dissents also referred to the justified infringement approach. See Bellotti, 435
U.S. at 809-21, 826 & n.6.
106. Id. at 823.
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Justice White articulated the view that certain of the values served
by the first amendment were not furthered by corporate political speech.
In determining whether the self-expression or self-fulfillment value 107 is
served by constitutional protection of a given type of speech, the identity
of the source is relevant because the aim is to protect the rights of speak-
ers. Justice White concluded that because corporate communications
"do not represent a manifestation of individual freedom or choice,
10 8
they are "entitled to less First Amendment protection."' 10 9
The view expressed by Justice White has received extensive exposi-
tion in the work of Professor C. Edwin Baker. 10 Rejecting the market-
place of ideas model, according to which the rights of hearers are
protected by the first amendment, Professor Baker contends that the lib-
erty model provides the most coherent theory of the first amendment."'
According to the liberty model, the first amendment protects only the
rights of speakers, and this protection is based solely on society's interest
in advancing self-expression and individual freedom of choice.
112
Professor Baker maintains that the commercial speech of business
enterprises should not be constitutionally protected because it is "rooted
in the profit-oriented requirements of the enterprise [and] fails in princi-
ple to exhibit individually chosen allegiance to personal values."" 13
Baker also contends that the political speech of the commercial corpora-
tion, like its commercial speech, should not be constitutionally protected
because it "may represent the management's judgment that the com-
pany's income, profits, and stability would be reduced or endangered"' 14
by a political outcome other than that advocated. Such communication
reflects "values which do not originate in either individual or collective
visions or decisions about what humanity should be." 15 In fact, this
characteristic of corporate political speech is a product of legal con-
straints, not merely social pressures, on the governance of business cor-
porations." 6 According to the liberty model, such corporate speech
107. These terms were used by Professor Emerson. See T. EMERSON, TOWARD A GEN-
ERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 3-7 (1966).
108. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 805.
109. Id. at 807.
110. See Baker, Commercial Speech: A Problem in the Theory of Freedom, 62 IOWA L.
REv. 1 (1976) [hereinafter cited as BakerCommercial Speech]; Baker, Realizing Self-Realiza-
tion: Corporate Political Expenditures and Redish's The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L.
REV. 646 (1982); Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 U.C.L.A. L.
REV. 964 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Baker, Scope].
111. Baker, Scope, supra note 110, at 964.
112. Id. at 991-92.
113. Baker, Commercial Speech, supra note 110, at 40.
114. Id. at 35.
115. Id. at 36.
116. Corporate political speech must represent management's judgment that the political
outcome advocated is in the corporate interest. See infra notes 141-61 & accompanying text.
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should not be protected by the first amendment because it is not a prod-
uct of individual choice or self-expression.
The use of the liberty model in the "no constitutional protection"
approach yields an unsatisfactory theoretical justification for denying
first amendment protection to corporate political speech. The liberty
model fails, first, because it affords no protection for the interests of the
audience. The cases and most commentators agree that the first amend-
ment is meant to serve the interests of the "hearing" public as well as
those of the "speaking" public.'1 7 As noted earlier, to the extent that
corporate political speech serves these interests, it should receive consti-
tutional protection. Statutory restrictions, if they infringe upon the
rights of the audience to hear a particular point of view, 11 8 should be
justified only if they further the hearers' interests in having access to a
wider range of views.' 1 9
The liberty model is also unsatisfactory because it fails to recognize
that the first amendment serves more than just the self-fulfillment
value 20 and that protection of the rights of speakers or hearers is war-
ranted if such protection furthers those other values. As discussed
above, first amendment protection for corporate political speech may
lead to the invalidation of statutory restrictions on corporate spending in
ballot measure campaigns because the Court may find that the infringe-
ments are unjustified.12' Prior theoretical justifications for the "no con-
stitutional protection" approach, which are premised on the liberty
model of the first amendment, are unsatisfactory because they fail to ad-
dress all of the interests that freedom of speech is intended to serve and
that may be implicated in statutory restrictions on corporate political
speech.
Toward a New Theoretical Justification for the "No
Constitutional Protection" Approach
Because of the inadequacies of both the justified infringement ap-
proach and the previously advanced versions of the "no constitutional
protection" approach, discussed in prior sections, a new theoretical justi-
fication for denying constitutional protection to the political speech of
business corporations is needed. This justification should be compatible
117. For cases, see Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 783; Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S.
367, 390 (1969) (FCC's fairness doctrine upheld on grounds of first amendment rights of view-
ers and listeners); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969) (reversing conviction for view-
ing obscene films in privacy of one's home, partly on ground that "the Constitution protects
the right to receive information and ideas"). For commentary, see infra notes 128-31 & ac-
companying text.
118. See supra notes 80-81 & accompanying text.
119. See supra text accompanying note 80.
120. See infra notes 128-31 & accompanying text.
121. See supra notes 83-94 & accompanying text.
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with most first amendment theories, which hold that the amendment
serves more than just the self-fulfillment value. In this section of the
Note, such a justification first is proposed and then is fully examined.
The proposed theory can be summarized as follows: free speech on
current issues of public policy is protected not only because it promotes
self-expression, self-fulfillment, and free choice; 122 protection is also
granted to facilitate successful self-government and the enactment of just
and equitable laws through the operation of the democratic processes
established by the Constitution. 123 Accordingly, the absence of individual
choice in the political speech of business corporations is an insufficient
ground for denying it first amendment protection; if the corporate com-
munication nevertheless advances the purpose of successful self-govern-
ment, then it warrants constitutional protection.
Protection for speech that promotes successful self-government
might be granted based on the rights of hearers and the value of the
communication to them as voters, 124 because the communication facili-
tates the selection of just laws. Protection might also be granted based on
the right of speakers to publish their views of what political result would
be just, because protection would facilitate the advocacy of just
alternatives.125
Corporate political speech, however, is informed with neither the
personal choice nor the individual values that would justify first amend-
ment protection. The following discussion will demonstrate that the cor-
porate speaker is unable to formulate or advocate positions on public
policy issues based on considerations of justice, at least as the concept is
defined by many.' 26 This inability warrants denying first amendment
protection to corporate political speech, except insofar as it aids the hear-
ing and voting public. The rights of the speaker cannot justify first
amendment protection for the political speech of business corporations.
Theories of the First Amendment-Protected Interests-Rationale
Underlying Protection of Political Speech
Professor Baker has demonstrated how and why the protection of
corporate political speech fails to serve the self-fulfillment value.' 27 Most
commentators contend, however, that the first amendment serves other
122. See infra notes 128-31 & accompanying text.
123. See infra note 132 & accompanying text.
124. See supra notes 78-80 & accompanying text.
125. The concept ofjustice is, of course, difficult to define precisely, so it will be necessary
to consider definitions that various thinkers have given. See infra notes 162-75 & accompany-
ing text.
126. See infra note 136.
127. See supra notes 110-15 & accompanying text. Justice White endorsed this view when
he maintained that some of the values protected by the first amendment are not served by the
protection of corporate political speech. See supra notes 107-09 & accompanying text.
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values in addition to the self-fulfillment value. Doctor Alexander
Meiklejohn argued that the protection of freedom of speech is granted
solely in the interest of effective self-government. 28 Professor Emerson
contends that first amendment protection serves several broad categories
of values. 29 A system of free expression, he says, is necessary to assure
self-fulfillment, discern the truth, secure participation in social and polit-
ical decision-making, and maintain the balance between stability and
change in society. 130 While apparently accepting Emerson's list, Profes-
sor Tribe says that freedom of speech is "an end in itself, an expression of
the sort of society we wish to become and the sorts of persons we wish to
be." 131
These leading commentators thus agree that the first amendment
protects political speech at least in part to facilitate effective self-govern-
ment, presumably through the proper functioning of the democratic
political processes set out in the Constitution. The aim of these demo-
cratic processes is the enactment of just and equitable laws. This goal is
evident from the preamble to the Constitution, which states that the pur-
pose of the Constitution is to "establish justice" and to "promote the
general welfare."' 32 The first amendment plays a particularly important
role in promoting the enactment of just laws, which, in addition to serv-
ing the self-fulfillment value, may be said to be its most important
function.
The justness of laws enacted after public policy debate and demo-
cratic election is a product of speaker-advocates proposing just laws and
of hearer-voters choosing just laws. The freedoms that enable these par-
ticipants to perford their proper functions in this scheme are appropri-
ately protected by the first amendment and other constitutional
provisions.
If access to the political speech of business corporations facilitates
the voters' choice of just laws, then that speech merits constitutional pro-
tection based on the rights of hearers. Any restrictions of that access
would be justified only by a compelling governmental interest. 33
First amendment protection of the political speech of business cor-
porations arguably might be justified based on the rights of the speaker,
that is, on facilitating the performance of its role as advocate. If so, the
Court might well find that campaign spending limitations infringing
128. See A. MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM (1948).
129. See T. EMERSON, supra note 107, at 3-15.
130. Id.
131. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 576 (1978).
132. U.S. CONST. preamble.
133. As suggested earlier, it may be that corporate campaign spending limits do not re-
strict hearers' access to political ideas at all; on the other hand, if the rights of hearers are
infringed, a compelling interest may justify such restrictions. See supra notes 80-81 & accom-
panying text.
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upon the rights of these speakers to advance the interests of hearers are
not justified by any compelling state interest. 134 Such a finding is particu-
larly likely if the Court resorts to the absolute doctrine of Tornillo.
135
Logically, however, only speakers capable of proposing or advocat-
ing policy alternatives based on considerations of justice should receive
this protection. Speakers wholly incapable of injecting into their propos-
als that quality at which the system aims-justice-should not be enti-
tled to protection designed to facilitate that end.
The discussion that follows will demonstrate that a business corpo-
ration is incapable of proposing or advocating laws or policy alternatives
based on considerations of justice, however that concept is traditionally
defined. 136 This situation is not only a product of market and social real-
ities, but also is a function of the legal order. It follows that the business
corporation should not receive first amendment protection in its own
right as a political speaker.
The Corporate Speaker and Political Speech
The Inapplicability of the Right of Association
Initially, it seems plausible that a corporation's political speech
could receive constitutional protection based on the rights of its mem-
bers-the shareholders and managers-to associate and to exercise their
right to speak in this way. The Court has recognized that when the first
amendment protects the pursuit of goals and activities by individuals,
those individuals may join together to pursue such goals and activities. 137
A compelling governmental interest must be shown in order to justify an
infringement upon the constitutionally protected right of association of
members of political organizations.
138
Problems arise, however, when this "right of association" analysis is
applied to corporate political speech. The rise of the modem corporation
has resulted in the separation of ownership and control in large public
corporations. 139 Thus, the corporation's political speech may not reflect
the views of its shareholders to the same degree that a political organiza-
134. See, e.g., Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (4978).
135. See supra notes 83-94 & accompanying text.
136. "Justice" has been defined in a multiplicity of ways. This Note focuses on the two
theories ofjustice most prominent in the Anglo-American tradition. See infra notes 162-75 &
accompanying text.
137. L. TRIBE, supra note 131, at 702.
138. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 463 (1957); see also Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S.
477, 489 (1975).
139. See A. BERLE & G. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY
(rev. ed. 1967); R. CARNER, MANAGEMENT CONTROL AND THE LARGE CORPORATION
(1970); Jones, Corporate Governance: Who Controls the Large Corporation?, 30 HASTINGS L.J.
1261, 1285 (1979).
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tion's speech reflects the views of its members. 140 Political organizations
comprise people with similar political beliefs, at least on certain issues,
and exist for the very purpose of speaking on those political issues. Cor-
porations are composed of individuals interested in making money, who
may have quite dissimilar political views.
Of course, to the extent that a corporation's political speech con-
cerns issues having a significant impact on the business of the corpora-
tion, all shareholders are financially interested in a particular political
outcome. But because the individual shareholders are persons with val-
ues distinct from the corporation's and with diverse views on public pol-
icy, their political choices may differ from those advocated by the
corporation. Their financial interests in the outcome may be outweighed
by their political interests in advancing their views on proper public pol-
icy. As voters, free of any obligation to be entrepreneurial, they can
choose to vote in accordance with their political, as opposed to financial,
interests.
As the discussion below will demonstrate, no such choice between
economic and political alternatives is available to shareholders in their
capacity as owners of a corporation which is presumed to speak for them.
Even if they could convince management or a majority of the sharehold-
ers to endorse a political outcome that is adverse to the common financial
interest, the corporation may not be used to advocate such an outcome
because of the laws of fiduciary duty which govern the management of
corporations.
State Corporation Laws of Fiduciary Duty
State corporation law traditionally provides that business corpora-
tions be managed with a view toward maximizing corporate profit and
shareholder gain. 141 Accordingly, the traditional rule is that directors of
corporations must act only with the welfare of the corporation as their
ultimate end. 142 Directors must exercise their judgment "uninfluenced
by personal, or any considerations other than the welfare of the
corporation."1 43
Directors who act to further an interest other than that of the corpo-
ration are subject to personal liability via a shareholder derivative suit
under state law.144 Some early decisions upheld directors' actions seem-
ingly in the interest of some other segment of society on the ground that
140. See O'Kelley, The Constitutional Rights of Corporations Revisited: Social and Polit-
ical Expression and the Corporation After First National Bank v. Bellotti, 67 GEo. L.J. 1347,
1377 (1979).
141. PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND STRUCTURE: RESTATEMENT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.01 (Tent. Draft No.1, 1982) [hereinafter cited as PRINCIPLES].
142. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 204 Mich. 459, 507, 170 N.W. 668, 684 (1919).
143. Bayer v. Beran, 49 N.Y.S.2d 2, 6 (Sup. Ct. 1944).
144. See generally N. LATrIN, THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS 283 (2d ed. 1971).
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they were profit-enhancing in the long run. 145 According to these cases,
the business judgment rule protects corporate directors if, but only if,
they intend to advance the corporate interest when making such
decisions. 146
This protection would not be available to directors who admitted to
acting with other interests in view and who did not claim to be at least
indirectly advancing the corporate interest by their actions. 147 Such di-
rectors would be liable to the corporation for the amounts by which their
actions have adversely affected the economic interest of the corpora-
tion.148 Similarly, actions taken pursuant to a majority vote of share-
holders would also be voidable via derivative suit and could subject the
board of directors to personal liability for waste of corporate assets.
149
Thus, a corporation may not further the interests of another segment of
society to the exclusion of its own economic interests150 because, accord-
ing to the traditional view, such actions would be illegal.
The traditional view has somewhat given way, particularly among
commentators, to the notion that corporations be allowed to pursue
other, societal interests. Advocates of corporate social responsibility
favor allowing the corporation's decision-makers the freedom to expend
reasonable sums, or to forsake profits to a reasonable extent, to advance
goals that serve only the social interest.151 The recognition of such altru-
istic activity as legitimate in its own right has been described as bringing
corporate social responsibility "out of the closet." 152 No longer would
the director of a corporation have to make the "long-term corporate ben-
145. See, eg., Schlensky v. Wrigley, 95 Ill. App. 2d 173, 237 N.E.2d 776 (1968); A.P.
Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, 13 N.J. 145, 98 A.2d 581 (1953); Steinway v. Steinway & Sons, 40
N.Y.S. 718 (Sup. Ct. 1896).
146. Courts consistently protect directors when such claims are made. Weiss, Social Reg-
ulation of Business Activity: Reforming the Corporate Governance System to Resolve an Institu-
tional Impasse, 28 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 343, 424 (1981).
147. The absence of cases supporting this proposition is predictable. Directors would sel-
dom, if ever, admit in the course of litigation, even if it were true, that their actions did not at
least indirectly advance the corporate interest.
148. See D. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES 684-85 (1973).
149. See Rogers v. Hill, 289 U.S. 582, 591-92 (1932); see also Heller v. Boylan, 29
N.Y.S.2d 653, 667 (Sup. Ct. 1941).
150. Of course, the corporate interest and societal interest are not always mutually exclu-
sive. The point of this discussion is to examine the legal constraints that apply to corporate
managers when these interests are, in fact, mutually exclusive; conclusions can then be drawn
regarding the raison d'etre for corporate political speech and the ability of corporate managers
to advocate public policy positions based on considerations of justice.
151. See, eg., Dodd, For Whom are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV.
1145, 1147-48 (1932). For a general discussion of the corporate social responsibility theory,
see Epstein, Societal, Managerial, and Legal Perspectives on Corporate Social Responsibility-
Product and Process, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 1287 (1979).
152. Conard, Response: The Meaning of Corporate Social Responsibility-Variations on a
Theme of Edwin M, Epstein, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 1321, 1326 (1979).
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efit" argument to avoid liability for humanitarian corporate
contributions. 1
53
This view was adopted in at least one case, which involved corporate
charitable contributions. In Theodora Holding Corp. v. Henderson,1 54 the
court, relying on an express statutory authorization for "donations for
the public welfare or for charitable, scientific or educational pur-
poses,"' 55 held that the director who caused the corporation to contrib-
ute to a charitable foundation was not liable to the corporation for any
adverse economic impact to it. The view was also recognized in a recent
tentative draft of the American Law Institute's Restatement. Section
2.01(c) of that draft provides that a business corporation "may devote
resources, within reasonable limits, to public welfare, humanitarian, edu-
cational, and philanthropic purposes."'
56
Does corporate campaign spending fall within this emerging "social
responsibility" exception to the general rule of fiduciary duty? It might
seem so, at least according to the ALI formulation, if such spending con-
stitutes devoting resources to public welfare purposes. But the comments
in the ALI report define "public welfare" in terms of clearly defined gov-
ernmental policy or "declared social policies."' 57 Corporate campaign
spending amounts to devoting resources to the determination of future,
as yet undeclared, public policy. Thus, such spending seems not to fall
within the ALI formulation of the corporate social responsibility view.
This is as it should be; even if the law grants corporate directors or share-
holder majorities the right to reallocate reasonable sums in the social
interest, this power should be confined to the pursuit of goals that are in
the social interest as already determined by the public political
process.
1 58
That the actions of corporate management will in fact usually be in
the corporate interest is a function of the social order. This situation,
153. Management can always argue that actions in the social interest are also in the long-
term corporate interest. In such a case, the ultimate motive for the Board's action must be the
latter-unless the doctrine of corporate social responsibility is recognized. Even this doctrine,
however, does not apply to corporate political speech, which therefore must always be moti-
vated, at least ultimately, by a desire to advance the corporate interest. See infra notes 157-61
& accompanying text.
154. 257 A.2d 398 (Del. Ch. 1969).
155. Id. at 404-05 (citing DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 122(9) (1974)).
156. PRINCIPLES, supra note 141, § 2.01(c).
157. Id. at 31-32 (emphasis added).
158. There is presumably some consensus on these goals in the body politic. More signifi-
cantly, the dissenting shareholder who has her proportionate share of corporate funds reallo-
cated already will have been, in some sense, responsible for the policy goal being advanced by
such expenditures by virtue of her participation in the electoral process as an individual voter.
Such goals are established as a result of either direct election by voters or a determination by
their elected representatives. A shareholder with the right to vote thus, theoretically at least,
will have had some involvement in the policy determination.
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recognized by Justice Douglas,159 is unlikely to change even if the law
grants corporations more latitude to act in the social interest.1 60 More-
over, according to even the most progressive views of corporate social
responsibility, corporate political speech must be directed exclusively to-
ward political results that are in the corporate interest. 161 When spend-
ing to affect the outcome of ballot measure, or candidate, elections, the
managers of a corporation are legally obligated to have the interest of the
corporation and its shareholders as their ultimate concern.
Theories of Justice
Given the legal constraints imposed by fiduciary duty, corporate
management is incapable of proposing or advocating public policy alter-
natives based solely on considerations of justice. Corporate speakers are
handicapped in such a way that they are incapable of purposefully imbu-
ing their proposals with the characteristic at which the democratic polit-
ical system aims-justice. 162  According to the two most influential
theories of justice in Anglo-American jurisprudence, which are discussed
below, 163 this handicap is a necessary product of the legal constraint of
fiduciary duty.
One need not overlook the fact that individual voters often "vote
their pocketbooks." Likewise, individuals and political organizations
often propose and advocate political positions because of the potential
economic impact on the speakers. But these speakers have the ability, at
least, to exercise their constitutional right of free speech to attempt to
institute just laws. They are free to subordinate their own economic in-
terest to the interests of others. Corporate management, however, is pre-
cluded from acting in this way.
A comprehensive survey of philosophical theories of justice is be-
yond the scope of this Note. Yet, a brief discussion of two prominent
theories I " demonstrates how the legal constraint of fiduciary duty pre-
159. See Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 245-46, 265-67 (1963) (Douglas, J., concurring)
(remarking that a restaurant corporation's policy of refusing to serve black customers is the
result of "corporate motives" and not "personal prejudices").
160. N. CHAMBERLAIN, THE LIMITs OF CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY 3-4 (1973).
161. See supra notes 156-58 & accompanying text. Predictably, there is an absence of case
law directly on point here. Corporate management is unlikely to admit in the course of share-
holder litigation that its actions were not intended to advance the corporate interest, even in
the rare case in which this is so.
162. The discussion here will consider the two theories of justice which are most promi-
nent in American legal philosophy and their ramifications for the "no constitutional protec-
tion" approach.
163. See infra note 164.
164. The theories selected for examination here were chosen because of their leading
places in American legal philosophy. Rawls' work is an important formulation of the social
contract theory and has had a remarkable impact beyond the circles of academic philosophy.
READING RAwLS at xi (N. Daniels ed. 1975). For explications and criticisms of Rawls' work,
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vents the corporate speaker from proposing or advocating public policy
positions based on considerations of justice. The proper focus here is on
the methodology employed in arriving at conclusions about a just legal
order. How do we determine whether a given policy is just? What does
it mean to consider justice when formulating positions on public policy?
The question of which laws or social structures are just is logically in-
dependent of the initial methodological question.
In A Theory of Justice, John Rawls incorporates and expands upon
the social contract theory advanced by such writers as Locke, Rousseau,
and Kant.165 While people may "disagree about which principles should
define the basic terms of their association," Rawls says, they can "still
agree that institutions are just when . . . the rules determine a proper
balance between competing claims to the advantages of social life."' 66 In
short, justice is fairness, Rawls says, and he attempts to provide a meth-
odology on which all who accept that notion can agree.
According to the contractarian method Rawls proposes, the test of
whether a particular law 167 is fair or just is whether it is the sort of rule
that rational, self-interested persons would choose from what he calls the
"original position."' 168 This is a hypothetical pre-social position in which
a person is ignorant of the actual place he will take in society. Such a
person operates behind a "veil of ignorance"'169 which conceals his per-
sonal inclinations and aspirations. 170 This method is intended as "a nat-
ural guide to intuition"; one can, and must, adopt the perspective of the
original position at any time in order to consider the justness of some
principle or law.171 The purpose of this maneuver is "to make vivid to
ourselves the restrictions that it seems reasonable to impose on argu-
ments for principles of justice and, therefore, on these principles
themselves." 7
2
The restraints imposed by the laws of fiduciary duty prohibit corpo-
see generally id.; B. BARRY, THE LIBERAL THEORY OF JUSTICE (1973). Mill's work is a
seminal formulation of the utilitarian theory, which has been an important factor in the devel-
opment of English and American law. E. POLLACK, JURISPRUDENCE 421 (1972). The con-
tractarian and utilitarian theories, of course, do not exhaust logically the positions one might
take in defining justice.
165. J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 11 (1971). Social contract theory is that body of
political theory holding that the appropriate structure of society is one based on some agree-
ment-prehistoric, implied, or hypothetical-among the individuals who make it up. See 7
THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 465-67 (1967 & reprint 1972).
166. J. RAWLS supra note 165, at 5.
167. Rawls actually attempts "to formulate a reasonable conception of justice for the basic
structure of society," but conjectures that it will be possible to use the theory to answer ques-
tions about particular rules "with suitable modifications." Id. at 8 (emphasis added).
168. Id. at 12.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 11-13, 136-42.
171. Id. at 139.
172. Id. at 18.
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rate managers from adopting the perspective of the original position, or
acting on the results they reach thereby, when making decisions about
corporate political speech. They are legally bound to consider the eco-
nomic interest of the corporation-given its actual position in society
and its singularly economic aspirations. 173 According to Rawls' version
of the contract theory, then, it is impossible for one in this position to
develop or to advocate public policy alternatives based on considerations
of justice. Corporate political speakers must say what they say, not be-
cause it is fair or just, but because it is in the corporate interest.
Opposed to the social contract theory is the utilitarian theory of
John Stuart Mill and others. 174 According to this theory, a law is just
when it achieves the greatest net satisfaction considering all the individu-
als belonging to the society that the legal order governs. 175 Individuals
may disagree as to what rules will, in fact, have the effect of maximizing
utility in this way. But the utilitarian method requires a deliberate con-
sideration and weighing of the interests of all members of society.
Corporate managers are legally obligated to consider only the inter-
ests of a particular portion of society: the shareholders of the corpora-
tion. They are legally prohibited from considering the effects of public
policy alternatives on the interests of extra-corporate members of society.
Their ultimate end must be to maximize the net satisfaction of their spe-
cific constituency-the shareholders. Considerations of justice-as de-
fined by utilitarian theory-cannot inform or control their decisions
regarding the political speech of the corporation.
Conclusion: The Corporate Speaker and Political Speech
The economic interest of the corporation is the raison d'etre of cor-
porate political speech. That a policy advocated by a corporation is equi-
table or just, in either the contractarian or utilitarian sense, can only be
fortuitous. Accordingly, first amendment protection for corporate polit-
ical speech is not warranted based on the rights of the speaker. The goal
of enacting just laws through democratic processes is not furthered by
granting such protection, unless it is based on the rights of hearers and
the protection of the voters' ability to perform their function.
Statutory limitations on corporate spending in ballot measure cam-
paigns should not be invalidated for infringing upon the first amendment
rights of business corporations. Such corporations should have no first
amendment rights of political free speech to be infringed.
173. See supra notes 141-61 & accompanying text.
174. See generally J. MILL, UTILITARIANISM (1863); H. SIDGWICK, THE METHODS OF
ETHICS (1907); H. SIDGWICK, OUTLINES OF THE HISTORY OF ETHICS (1902).
175. J. RAWLS, supra note 165, at 22.
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Some Ramifications of the Theory
A question that surfaces in the wake of the theory outlined above is
the one that concerned Chief Justice Burger in Bellotti:176 How do we
protect the first amendment rights of press corporations if the political
speech of corporations is not so protected? 177 How could one protect the
right of the press, when operated in the corporate form, to editorialize
and to advocate certain positions on political issues? 178 Arguably, the
guarantee of freedom of the press would suffice.' 79 Chief Justice Burger,
however, rejected an interpretation of the first amendment distinguishing
freedom of the press from freedom of speech in this fashion.' 80
But when political speech takes the form of editorializing, media
corporations are not constrained by the laws of fiduciary duty to consider
only the interests of their shareholders. Editorials are written by employ-
ees who are not bound by the laws of fiduciary duty. Thus, when writing
or publishing these pieces, the corporation's employees are free to advo-
cate policy based on considerations of justice.
If a press corporation chooses to influence the outcome of a political
campaign or referendum by contributing to a candidate's campaign or to
a committee in support of or in opposition to a ballot measure, it will be
subject to the restraints that apply to ordinary business corporations.
When spending corporate money in this way, media managers should be
bound by the laws of fiduciary duty. Thus the media corporation would
not receive first amendment protection for political speech in the form of
corporate contributions. But the right to editorialize, which is central to
the freedom of the press, would be protected by the first amendment be-
cause the editorial's position can be based on considerations of justice.' 8'
Moreover, because the reasons for constitutionally protecting com-
mercial speech and political speech can differ, the denial of first amend-
176. See 435 U.S. at 796 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
177. This question was not reached by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in Bel-
lotti. See First Nat'l Bank v. Attorney Gen., 371 Mass. 773, 784-85 n.13, 359 N.E.2d 1262,
1270 n.13 (1977).
178. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 797 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
179. For an argument that the press clause gives some protection to the media that the
speech clause does not grant to the general citizenry, see Bezanson, The New Free Press Guar-
antee, 63 VA. L. REV. 731 (1977). See generally W. LOCKHART, supra note 104, at 1007-11.
180. The Chief Justice perceives two difficulties with this interpretation: (1) The Framers
probably did not contemplate a special privilege for the institutional press, and (2) the espe-
cially privileged class is difficult to define. See Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 798-802 (Burger, C.J.,
concurring). The Chief Justice was unmoved by former Justice Stewart's arguments to the
contrary. See Stewart, "Or of the Press, " 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631 (1975).
181. Justice Rehnquist reaches the same result--different treatment for a press corpora-
tion's editorial speech and its campaign contributions-by way of a different theory. He ar-
gues that the freedom to editorialize is essential to the conduct of a press corporation and
therefore protected, while the freedom to contribute to political campaigns is neither essential
nor protected. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 825 n.4 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 36
CORPORATE CAMPAIGN SPENDING
ment protection for the political speech of the business corporation does
not necessarily imply that its commercial speech should be similarly
treated. The recent development of protection for commercial speech
182
is not inconsistent with the theory and proposal advanced here.'
83
Finally, it should be emphasized that only constitutional protection
for corporate political speech has been considered here. Even if such pro-
tection is denied, statutory protection is not precluded. The entry of the
corporate speaker into the political debate can still be provided for, and
controlled by, appropriate legislative bodies. Reliance on the political
process to ensure an adequate level of participation by interested corpo-
rations is not unreasonable. Corporations are, and will very likely re-
main, perhaps the best-represented segment of our society in the political
process.
Summary
The ability of business corporations to defeat ballot measures
through massive spending frustrates the purpose of direct democracy.
Limits on corporate contributions and expenditures are the only effective
means of remedying this situation. Although such limits have been en-
acted by the voters, and by their elected representatives, recent Supreme
Court decisions have invalidated many of these provisions and have cast
doubt on the constitutionality of others.'
84
Restrictions on corporate political speech serve compelling govern-
mental interests: preserving the integrity of the electoral process, and
restoring the original goal of direct democractic processes and the voters'
confidence in them. Thus, corporate spending limits should be upheld as
justified infringements of first amendment rights.
Though these limits may infringe upon the rights of hearers, they
nonetheless increase the value of those same rights. To the extent that
these restrictions are seen as infringements upon the rights of speakers,
182. See Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Township of Wilingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 95 (1977) (local
ordinance prohibiting real estate "For Sale" or "Sold" signs invalidated as a violation of first
amendment); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748, 764 (1976) (state statute prohibiting the advertising of prices of prescription drugs
invalidated as a violation of the first amendment).
183. The Court has protected commercial speech (4e., that which does no more than pro-
pose a private commercial transaction, see Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on
Human Relations, 413 U.S. 379, 385 (1972)) "because it furthers the societal interest in the
'free flow of commercial information.' " Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 783 (quoting Virginia State Bd. of
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 764 (1976)). Corporate
political speech might be protected for similar reasons, te., based on the rights of hearers. See
supra notes 78-80 & accompanying text. It has been contended here that protecting corporate
political speech based on the right of the speaker, as the Bellotti majority did, is unwarranted.
See supra note 82.
184. See supra notes 33-56 & accompanying text.
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they should also be justified as serving compelling governmental inter-
ests. The Court, however, may resort to the "absolute" doctrine of
Tornillo and decline to find infringements upon speakers' rights justified
by the need to safeguard the rights of hearers.
Anticipating the Court's cursory treatment, advocates of corporate
spending limits can argue that the corporate political speaker should not
enjoy first amendment protection in its own right. Such protection serves
none of the values or goals that the first amendment is intended to serve,
according to generally accepted first amendment theories. Corporate
political speech does not represent a manifestation of individual free
choice, and so its protection does not serve the self-fulfillment value.1
8 5
Because the corporate speaker is incapable of developing or advocating
public policy positions based on considerations of justice as traditionally
defined, its speech does not serve to advance the goal of successful self-
government which first amendment protection of political speech is also
intended to further. 186 First amendment protection for the editorial
speech of press corporations, or for the commercial speech of business
corporations in general, is not inconsistent with this view.
The goal of direct democracy is a noble one. Efforts to safeguard
the ballot measure process in order to further that goal should not be
invalidated by the Court. Laws of corporate governance and laws grant-
ing advantages to businesses operated in the corporate form, when com-
bined with unwarranted first amendment protection for the political
speech of these entities, produce a disturbing and anomalous situation.
The health of the political process depends on the participation of well-
informed voters acting in accordance with their political and moral val-
ues. Yet the richest, and therefore the most powerful, actors in the body
politic, business corporations, are legally constrained to act without re-
gard to such values. The Constitution should not stand in the way of
reforms necessary to allay the threat to direct democracy posed by this
disturbing anomaly.
Matthew J. Geyer*
185. See supra note 127 & accompanying text.
186. See supra notes 122-75 & accompanying text.
* Member, Third Year Class. I would like to thank Professor Alan Garfinkel, of the
Philosophy Department at California State University, Northridge, for calling my attention to
the disturbing anomaly created by the operation of the law of corporate fiduciary duty and the
rule of First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978), which this Note explores.
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